From the Hague to Belém : Did the ICJ Advisory Opinion matter at COP30?
From the Hague to Belém : Did the ICJ Advisory Opinion matter at COP30?
“This is a victory for our planet, for climate justice and for the power of young people to make a difference. Young Pacific Islanders initiated this call for humanity to the world. And the world must respond.”[1]
Introduction
On 29 March 2023, The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) asked the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to clarify States’ obligations under international law to protect the climate system from anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions for present and future generations, and to determine the legal consequences for States whose acts or omissions cause significant climate-related harm. On 23 July 2025, the ICJ unanimously delivered its Advisory Option (AO). While advisory opinions are not cases and therefore not formally binding, they are considered authoritative interpretations of existing law that is binding. The AO recognises that the climate crisis is an “existential problem of planetary proportions” and that taking action to mitigate and adapt is a requirement under multiple sources of international law. The Court also found that United Nations (UN) Member States can be held liable for breaches of their legal obligations to protect the climate system.
The Opinion is thus a landmark ruling, and one that many hoped would revitalise international climate governance at a moment of deepening institutional doubt. This paper examines whether, and to what extent, the Opinion influenced the 30th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP30) in Belém, Brazil, the first Conference of the Parties, arguably the most consequential forum for international climate governance, to take place following its issuance. Most scholarship on climate litigation has so far focused on analysing specific cases and rights-based claims, with considerably less attention paid to the governance impact of such rulings. The literature on the Opinion itself is no exception, remaining largely confined to analysing its legal content rather than examining its effects.
The paper proceeds in two steps: it first considers the influence expected before COP30, drawing on legal analysis and anticipatory advocacy, before turning to the influence actually observed during the negotiations.
Expected Influence
“We hope that by the time we get to Belém, this advisory opinion will have permeated through the understanding of everybody who’s at those negotiations.”[2]
Different actors anticipated that the AO would influence COP30 in Bélem. Some through legal analysis of the Court’s findings, others, especially NGOs, by urging its use as an advocacy tool. Based on Lima’s identified channels through which the AO could shape climate politics,[3] I first examine the procedural influence of the AO on negotiation dynamics, and then its substantive influence on COP30 outcomes.
A. Expected Influence on Negotiation Dynamics
In terms of negotiation dynamics, several aspects of the AO were expected to matter: the finding that COP decisions may produce legal effects, the duty to cooperate, the Court’s reading of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), and the AO’s anticipated use as a legal yardstick.
Legal Effects of COP Decisions
The ICJ found that COP decisions may have legal effect (1) when treaties explicitly authorize it, and (2) when the decisions constitute “subsequent agreements” interpreting treaties (para. 184). As for (2) the condition is that it expresses “agreement in substance”.
Since the ICJ did not clarify what “agreement in substance” means, some authors predicted that future COP decisions might contain preambulatory language excluding the expression of an agreement in substance.[4] Equally, States might become bound by obligations they may not have explicitly consented to because COPs do not have a voting procedure, but adopt decisions by consensus.[5] Other authors have similarly argued that the AO could make multilateralism more difficult and create a chilling effect, because some States may be reluctant to accept vague or ambitious wording, for fear of accountability.[6] At the same time, COPs have “moved from the sidelines to center stage as playmakers in international lawmaking”.[7]
Duty to Cooperate
The ICJ held that “the duty of States to cooperate for the protection of the environment” is a rule of customary international law (CIL) (para. 140) and emphasised the intrinsic link between cooperation and the obligation to prevent significant environmental harm (para. 141). It further held that this duty is one of due-diligence-based conduct, noting that good-faith cooperation requires taking COP guidance into account (para. 218).
This finding was found to likely influence the way States would negotiate because repeated obstruction at negotiations may constitute a breach of CIL.[8] It also led UN experts to urge States “to negotiate in good faith in accordance with the [AO]”,[9] and a “Guide for Negotiators” to focus, among others, on the need and obligation for “serious” negotiations[10].
CBDR
The AO has established that developed nations bear the primary responsibility for taking the lead in emission reductions and for supporting climate action of developing countries. This can be seen to strengthen the Global South’s argument that developed countries need to be (more) ambitious in their mitigation efforts and enhance support for developing ones.[11] The Court, however, also confirmed that a country’s status as developing or developed can change.
Both of these findings have led some big emitting States to discredit the AO as radical and to downplay its significance,[12] a pattern likely to continue during and after COP30. Annex I countries might push for language emphasising collective efforts, thereby moving away from the differentiated obligations established in the Paris Agreement.[13] The consensus-based nature of the COP process also enables powerful countries to block decisions by exerting pressure on smaller States that depend on them for aid.[14] In addition, the country-status debate may create difficulties within negotiating blocs and existing alliances such as the G77 + China, or might even prompt new alliances.[15]
The AO as a Legal “Yardstick”
Several actors viewed the AO as providing a legal reference point for COP30. NGOs released guidance documents for negotiators,[16] and WYCJ trained young delegates through the Youth Negotiator Academy.[17] Vishal Prasad[18] characterised the ruling as offering “a compass […] and a yardstick of how we will measure action”.[19] Some legal observers echoed this view, with CIEL Senior Attorney Erika Lennon suggesting that “politics should take a backseat to the law”.[20]
B. Expected Influence on COP30 Outcomes
With respect to substantive obligations relevant for COP outcomes, the ICJ held that every State has an obligation to act with stringent due diligence and to “use all the means at its disposal” to prevent harm to the climate system (para. 281). The failure to take urgent and adequate measures may constitute an internationally wrongful act (para. 427). This is why UN experts urged COP negotiators to “avoid any positioning grounded in the voluntary nature of their commitments under the Paris Agreement, or the non-applicability of other relevant international obligations in the context of climate action”.[21]
The sections below follow the themes raised in the AO and echoed in analyses ahead of COP30.
NDCs and the 1.5°C Limit
The ICJ has found that States must ensure that their NDCs reflect their highest possible ambition, increase in ambition over time, and are collectively capable of effectively limiting warming to 1.5°C (para. 224), and that failure to do so constitutes a breach of their obligations (paras. 234–249).
NDCs are updated every five years, with the Belém COP serving as the deadline for the new round. Several authors have observed that the AO allows to test NDCs against the standard of due diligence, as well as their effective contribution to the 1.5°C limit.[22] This allows, small island and vulnerable States in particular, to demand greater ambition, especially from developed States.[23]
Fossil Fuel Phase-out
The ICJ specifically detailed that States are obliged to regulate conduct known to cause harm, beginning with fossil fuel production, consumption, licensing, and subsidies that are the primary source of greenhouse gases driving climate change. The failure to do so may constitute an internationally wrongful act (para. 427). The statement by UN experts, and two negotiation guides encouraged negotiators to focus on the phasing out of fossil fuels, so clearly addressed by the AO.[24]
Adaptation
As for adaptation, the ICJ makes especially clear that there is a link between climate change and human rights and that adaptation is a legal obligation. This could have a beneficial impact on discussions on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA).[25] On the one hand the AO “provides a solid legal foundation for adaptation financing […], notably through grant-based funding aimed at the most vulnerable nations”.[26] On the other hand, others did not “expect the COP to have detailed discussions about how to integrate human rights into climate change and climate adaptation”.[27]
Finance, Loss & Damage
The ICJ held that developed States have an obligation to provide financial resources to assist developing States with respect to mitigation and adaptation. This obligation must be interpreted in a manner that ensures staying within the 1.5°C temperature limit (paras. 264-265). With this in mind, finance, technology, and capacity building become modalities of the duty to cooperate,[28] and NGOs from the Global South have accordingly insisted that finance can no longer be considered charity.[29]
While the Court did not elaborate on loss and damage, it did clarify that remedies for the breach of international law obligations can take the form of monetary compensation. Having clarified States’ legal accountability for climate-related harms, the AO provides a basis for claims of climate reparations, “an outcome that […] vulnerable nations, can leverage to urge for a more robust Loss and Damage mechanism”.[30] The Loss and Damage Fund could now be considered as a prima facie mechanism for delivering on the duty of reparation for harm.[31]
Prospects for AO References in COP30 Texts
The different negotiator guides[32] show that significant work was done to make the AO a thing at COP30. At least one guide identified the inclusion of the AO in the cover decision, “which yields considerable political signalling power”,[33] as the ultimate goal, a strategy that Narulla likewise considered central to using the AO effectively.[34] Yet expectations among some key actors remained cautious. Vanuatu’s Minister for Climate Change, Ralph Regenvanu, said that he had “very little expectation for COP this year”.[35] At the same time, The Guardian wrote that “many countries are likely to limit public comments for diplomatic reasons, but have been busy seeking legal advice on how the ICJ opinion can strengthen their position during closed-door negotiations”.[36]
Actual Influence
“The truth at COP30, dubbed the ‘COP of Truth,’ is that countries are failing their legal duties.”[37]
This section examines the actual influence of the AO at COP30, held from 6 to 22 November 2025, and attempts to give explanations for its limited impact. My analysis draws on news coverage of the negotiations,[38] and on informal conversations with several observers who attended COP30[1] [2] [3] [4] The majority are advocates for more ambitious climate action, and while their accounts are valuable, they do not represent the full spectrum of views present at the negotiations.[39]
A. Evidence of AO Influence and Related Pushback
As discussed, many hoped the AO would serve as a legal lever at COP30, though diplomatic and political manoeuvring was also expected. In practice, articles and observers alike reported that the AO was barely referenced and, crucially, omitted from all final decision texts.
Despite that, civil society agrees that the AO was very much present at least in informal discussions, side events and external events.[40] WYCJ emphasised its “socialisation aspect,” noting that actors were able to argue on the basis of legal obligations rather than political arguments alone.[41] Gomes even described a "complete redistribution of power" in the corridors and pavilions. These accounts, which largely reflect civil society viewpoints, nonetheless indicate a noticeable gap between the Opinion's modest role in formal negotiations and its wider visibility in informal settings.
Despite the AO’s limited mention during negotiations, a number of observations can be made concerning the issues that were anticipated to gain momentum from it:
While the COP encouraged more NDCs it did not ensure that they align with the Court’s legal standards.[42]
Regarding fossil fuels, the COP did not make any progress regarding the required phase-out. This was, for most, the biggest disappointment and “the clearest sign that the COP” did not act on the AO.[43]
As for adaptation, some progress was made, as States agreed on a set of global adaptation indicators to monitor resilience and vulnerability.[44]
Regarding Just Transition, the Opinion's recognition of a "just and fast transition in line with best available science" was invoked by Fiji (for AOSIS), the Independent Alliance of Latin American and the Caribbean Nations (AILAC), Egypt, the UK, and Malawi, the latter seeking to frame transition finance as a legal necessity.[45]
As for finance, the outcome's call to “urg[e] developed country Parties to increase the trajectory of their collective provision of climate finance” falls short of the binding obligations articulated by the Court but can be seen both as a step in the right direction.[46]
Loss and damage came closest to meeting expectations. During WIM (Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage) negotiations, AILAC and Vanuatu invoked the Opinion as providing "an informed legal foundation" for advancing the issue, and a reference to it survived in the negotiating text until the final hours[47].
Ultimately, the AO did not make it into any decision text. Saudi Arabia and the Arab Group blocked its inclusion, though Vanuatu's Climate Minister Ralph Regenvanu noted that the Like-Minded Developing Countries would have done the same.[48] During WIM review negotiations, the Arab Group reportedly described any reference to the Opinion as a “deep, deep, deep red line.”[49] EU representatives also failed to support its inclusion, reportedly due to the vague nature of the draft references.[50]
B. Explaining the AO’s Limited Influence
Overall, authors have given different reasons for the COP’s limited engagement with the AO. Some attribute it to the political nature of COPs, which tend to avoid legal accountability and texts beyond the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement.[51] On the country divide, “vulnerable countries advocated for it because it validates their claims for justice, while historical and large polluters pushed back strongly to avoid acknowledging any legal framework that implies liability”.[52]
Singh notes that the Arab Group feared the ICJ's suggestion that developed/developing status is “not static” would “open the door to limitless legal liability for fossil fuel production”.[53] In any case, Saudi Arabia considers the Opinion “non-binding” and negotiations a “party-driven process based on consensus, and not litigation”. [54] Nollkaemper reads the lack of engagement as an “implicit pushback against the Court’s assertiveness”.[55]
A further explanation concerns limited coordination and legal expertise. Singh argues there was insufficient time to “fully socialise” the AO as a political tool between July and COP30, and both Singh and Narulla call for broader coalition-building beyond AOSIS and AILAC.[56] Narulla also points to the limited presence of lawyers in negotiation rooms and proposes weaving the AO into agenda-setting from the outset.[57] Some States reportedly lacked a mandate to negotiate the inclusion of an ICJ reference altogether.[58]
Finally, several observers noted that Pacific States exercised strategic restraint in Belém, deliberately avoiding a strong push for the AO in order to preserve momentum for a UNGA resolution.[59] These findings set the stage for the concluding discussion on the Opinion's potential future impact.
Conclusion: The AO’s Prospects for Shaping Future Climate Governance
“[The Advisory Opinion provides] a durable legal framework that will continue to guide negotiations”[60]
The COP30 experience demonstrates that while the AO did not reshape negotiations in the way some had anticipated, it nonetheless generated effects worth examining more closely. My analysis shows a mixed picture: initial high hopes for the AO’s impact at COP30 contrasted with its limited formal visibility in negotiations, with the lack of commitment to a phase-out of fossil fuels being particularly disappointing in light of the AO’s clear statement on this point. Yet civil society engagement around the Opinion remained remarkably active and ambitious. This is hardly a triumph, but it does not fully bear out the view, advanced by authors such as Paul Edwards, that climate change is ungovernable and that COPs do not serve any real purpose.[61] On the basis of my analysis, I would take the view that COPs continue to serve a meaningful function, and litigation, particularly the AO, does have a role to play in climate governance, one that should not be overlooked. I would therefore like to give a glimpse of hope by reflecting on what the AO might mean for future climate governance.
Most importantly, the absence of the Opinion from COP30 texts does not alter States’ legal obligations.[62] It may only be a matter of time before long political processes reflect existing law,[63] though some suggest years may pass before its full impact on negotiations becomes visible.[64] COP31 will offer another opportunity, and WYCJ has indicated it will maintain momentum.
Before then, Colombia’s Belém Declaration on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels, backed by 24 States, will hold its first conference in April 2026. While the absence of major economies beyond Europe signals limited political will,[65] Australia's endorsement as incoming COP31 Presidency may offer leverage, according to Narulla. Since early 2026, the UNGA has taken up a resolution on the Opinion, potentially clarifying how to operationalise it within the UN system, including through reporting requirements.[66] Despite US hostility and broader geopolitical tensions, it is expected to gain wide support.[67][5]
Beyond COPs, the Opinion may shift action into other international fora, including bodies governing energy, aviation, shipping, and agriculture, where progress may come faster.[68] It is already shaping NDC processes: Mexico’s NDC explicitly cites both the ICJ and IACtHR opinions,[69] while South Korea’s recently adopted NDC also appears influenced by the AO.[70]
Finally, a "litigation–diplomacy loop" may emerge, with courts invoking the Opinion to scrutinise (weak) targets and push negotiators toward higher standards.[71]
Footnotes and references
[1] UN Secretary-General, ‘Secretary-General Welcomes International Court of Justice’s Historic Advisory Opinion as Victory for Our Planet, Climate Justice’ (UN Press, 23 July 2025) SG/SM/22738 <https://press.un.org/en/2025/sgsm22738.doc.htm> accessed 4 December 2025.
[2] Ralph Regenvanu, Vanuatu’s minister for climate change, as cited by Dana Drugmand, ‘A Landmark Court Ruling Looms Over U.S. Absence at COP30’ (Inside Climate News, 18 November 2025) <https://insideclimatenews.org/news/18112025/international-court-climate-ruling-united-states-cop30-absence/> accessed 4 December 2025.
[3] Lima identified three channels through which the AO could influence climate governance, namely, by clarifying how COP decisions may acquire legal effect (procedural influence), by setting legal baselines that are hard to reverse (substantive influence), and by grounding key duties in customary law. Lucas Carlos Lima, ‘What Role Can the ICJ Advisory Opinion Play in Climate Politics?’ (SDG Knowledge Hub, 8 October 2025) <https://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/guest-articles/what-role-can-the-icj-advisory-opinion-play-in-climate-politics/> accessed 4 December 2025.
[4] Sebastián Rioseco and Tejas Rao, ‘From Sidelines to Center Stage: Conferences of the Parties (COPs) as Legal Playmakers’ (Verfassungsblog, 12 September 2025) DOI: 10.59704/eb4f15a5a1f0bd5e.
[5] Rioseco and Rao (n 4).
[6] Gitanjali Bajaj and others, ‘The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Change and Implications for COP30’ (DLA Piper, 7 November 2025) <https://www.dlapiper.com/en/insights/publications/2025/11/the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change-and-implications-for-cop30> accessed 27 November 2025; Daniel Bodansky, ‘The ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on Climate Change: Does It Throw a Wrench into the Negotiator’s Toolbox of Diplomatic Problem-Solving Techniques?’ (EJIL: Talk!, 23 September 2025) <https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-icjs-advisory-opinion-on-climate-change-does-it-throw-a-wrench-into-the-negotiators-toolbox-of-diplomatic-problem-solving-techniques/> accessed 4 December 2025; Nina Lakhani, ‘“Existential and Urgent”: What Impact Will ICJ Climate Ruling Have on Cop30?’ The Guardian (9 November 2025) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/nov/09/what-impact-will-icj-climate-ruling-have-on-cop30> accessed 27 November 2025.
[7] Rioseco and Rao (n 4).
[8] Bajaj and others (n 6).
[9] UN Special Rapporteurs, ‘Statement: COP30 Should Significantly Advance Human Rights-Based Climate Action in Accordance with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice’ (2025) <https://waps.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/11/cop30-must-advance-human-rights-based-climate-action-accordance> accessed 27 November 2025.
[10] CIEL and others, ‘Leveraging the ICJ Climate Ruling at COP 30. A Pocket Guide for Negotiators and Allies’ (2025) <https://www.ciel.org/reports/leveraging-the-icj-climate-ruling-at-cop30/> accessed 13 October 2026.
[11] WWF India, ‘How ICJ Climate Advisory Opinion Can Strengthen India’s Voice At Cop 30’ (November 2025) <https://www.wwfindia.org/news_facts/wwf_publications/how_icj_climate_advisory_opinion_can_strengthen_indias_voice_at_cop_30> accessed 5 December 2025.
[12] Lakhani (n 6).
[13] Bajaj and others (n 6).
[14] Lakhani (n 6).
[15] Bajaj and others (n 6).
[16] CIEL and others (n 10); Daniel Uribe Terán, ‘Leveraging the ICJ Opinion to Secure a Just Climate Future for the South during COP30’ (2025) 29 South Cent.
[17] Samira Ben Ali.
[18] Director of the Pacific Islands Students Fighting for Climate Justice (PISFCJ).
[19] Sera Tikotikovatu-Sefeti, ‘Pacific Eyes Turn to COP30: Hope, Skepticism, and the Weight of the ICJ Ruling’ (Islands Business, 31 October 2025) <https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/pacific-eyes-turn-to-cop30-hope-skepticism-and-the-weight-of-the-icj-ruling/> accessed 4 December 2025.
[20] Erika Lennon, ‘The Verdict Is In: To Comply with the Law, COP30 Must Deliver’ (Center for International Environmental Law, 22 October 2025) <https://www.ciel.org/cop30-climate-justice-legal-obligations/> accessed 11 December 2025.
[21] UN Special Rapporteurs (n 9).
[22] Katie Kouchakji, ‘Climate Crisis: ICJ Opinion and Finance Set to Dominate COP30 Talks’ (International Bar Association, 6 November 2025) <https://www.ibanet.org/Climate-crisis-ICJ-opinion-and-finance-set-to-dominate-COP30-talks> accessed 4 December 2025; Uribe Terán (n 16); Amy Cano Prentice, Emily Wilkinson and Aditi Solanki, ‘Keeping the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion Alive at COP30 and Beyond’ (ODI Global’s Resilient and Sustainable Islands Initiative (RESI) 2025).
[23] Lima (n 3); Uribe Terán (n 16).
[24] UN Special Rapporteurs (n 9); CIEL and others (n 10); Cano Prentice, Wilkinson and Solanki (n 22).
[25] Uribe Terán (n 16).
[26] Uribe Terán (n 16).
[27] Clara Pacce Pinto Serva, Vice-Chair of the International Bar Association Business Human Rights Committee, as cited by Kouchakji (n 22).
[28] Lima (n 3).
[29] Tikotikovatu-Sefeti (n 19); WWF India (n 11).
[30] WWF India (n 11).
[31] Uribe Terán (n 16).
[32] CIEL and others (n 10); Uribe Terán (n 16); Cano Prentice, Wilkinson and Solanki (n 22).
[33] Cano Prentice, Wilkinson and Solanki (n 22).
[34] Sam Morgan, ‘Where Was the World Court’s Landmark Climate Case at COP30?’ (The Jolt: FORESIGHT Climate & Energy, acast, 1 December 2025) <https://shows.acast.com/the-jolt-the-foresight-series-which-will-keep-you-updated-on-all-the-essential-energy-transition-stories/episodes/where-was-the-world-courts-landmark-climate-case-at-cop30> accessed 5 December 2025.
[35] Tikotikovatu-Sefeti (n 19).
[36] Lakhani (n 6).
[37] Erika Lennon as cited by CIEL, ‘COP30: Climate Talks Flounder, Countries Look Beyond UNFCCC to Phase Out Fossil Fuels’ (Center for International Environmental Law, 22 November 2025) <https://www.ciel.org/news/cop30-flounder-countries-look-beyond-unfccc-to-phase-out-fossil-fuels/> accessed 11 December 2025.
[38] Up until 11 December 2025.
[39] I had the opportunity to exchange with Jule Schnakenberg (Director) and Samira Ben Ali (Campaign Lead and EESC youth delegate) from World’s Youth for Climate Justice (WYCJ); Sigrid Karl (Austrian UNFCCC Youth Delegate); Baro Vincenta Ra Gabbert (Spokesperson for socio-ecological justice, Greenpeace Germany); and Johnny Stengel (Climate Activist). I also take into account observations shared on LinkedIn by Mariana Gomes (EU Climate Pact Ambassador for Portugal) and Harj Narulla (Advisor to the Solomon Islands on the AO). I refer to them individually or collectively as “observers”. While these perspectives cannot be considered fully representative, especially given the confidentiality of negotiations, they offer valuable insights that allow me to sketch as accurate an image as possible of how, and to what extent, the AO was used at COP30.
[40] Gomes, Schnakenberg, Ben Ali, Karl, Ra Gabbert.
[41] Ben Ali, Schnakenberg.
[42] Seven, ‘The ICJ Set the Bar, COP30 Walked Around It - In Conversation with SEVEN’s André Nollkaemper’ (Seven - University of Amsterdam, 24 November 2025) <https://seven.uva.nl/en/content/news/2025/november/cop-30-belem.html> accessed 5 December 2025; Alexandra Endres, ‘COP30: Why the ICJ climate report played a role after all’ (Table.Briefings, 9 December 2025) <https://table.media/en/climate/news-en/cop30-why-the-icj-climate-report-played-a-role-after-all> accessed 11 December 2025.
[43] Seven (n 42); Alexandra Endres, ‘COP30: Why the conference ignored countries’ duty to protect the climate’ (Table.Briefings, 25 November 2025) <https://table.media/en/climate/feature/cop30-why-the-conference-ignored-countries-duty-to-protect-the-climate> accessed 5 December 2025.
[44] Seven (n 42); Endres (n 42).
[45] Isabella Kaminski, ‘Did the ICJ Advisory Opinion Shift the Dial at COP30?’ The Wave (3 December 2025) <https://www.the-wave.net/icj-advisory-opinion-shift-climate-dial-cop30/> accessed 4 December 2025.
[46] Seven (n 42).
[47] Narulla.
[48] Endres (n 43).
[49] Schnakenberg, Ben Ali, and Kaminski (n 45).
[50] Ben Ali.
[51] Seven (n 42).
[52] Harjeet Singh, strategic advisor to the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative, as cited by Kaminski (n 45).
[53] Kaminski (n 45).
[54] Kaminski (n 45).
[55] Seven (n 42).
[56] Seven (n 42).
[57] Sam Morgan (n 34).
[58] Schnakenberg.
[59] Ben Ali, Vanuatu’s Minister Regenvanu as quoted by Endres (n 43); (n 34) and Stengel.
[60] Brazilian ICJ judge Leonardo Nemer Brant, as cited by Endres (n 42).
[61] Paul N Edwards, ‘Is Climate Change Ungovernable?’ (2024) 12 Lond Rev Int Law 351 <https://doi.org/10.1093/lril/lrae017>.
[62] Endres (n 43); Seven (n 42).
[63] Seven (n 42).
[64] Bajaj and others (n 6).
[65] Seven (n 42).
[66] Sam Morgan (n 34); Endres (n 43).
[67] Nina Lakhani, ‘Vanuatu Working toward UN Vote Aimed at Fighting Fossil-Fuel Industry Influence’ The Guardian (24 September 2025) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/24/vanuatu-climate-change-fossil-fuel-industry-influence> accessed 5 December 2025.
[68] Seven (n 42).
[69] Isabella Kaminski, ‘Climate Advisory Opinions Boost Mexico NDC Displacement Measures’ The Wave (3 December 2025) <https://www.the-wave.net/climate-advisory-opinions-boost-mexico-ndc-displacement/> accessed 4 December 2025.
[70] Changmin Choi, ‘South Korea’s Crucial Decision: Aligning NDC with ICJ Advisory Opinion’ (SDG Knowledge Hub, 17 September 2025) <https://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/guest-articles/south-koreas-crucial-decision-aligning-ndc-with-icj-advisory-opinion/> accessed 5 December 2025.
[71] Lima (n 3).
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